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I. INTRODUCTION
Among the many things for which the American legal system has
become distinctive, worth mention is the handling of collective litigation.
The different devices adopted in the United States ("U.S.") to process large
scale litigation and complex cases certainly have no equal in other
countries.' A variety of mechanisms like class action, multi-district
litigation, formal consolidation, informal aggregation and bankruptcy 2 have
permitted American courts to respond to the emergence of cases involving
large-scale accidents and disasters, financial fraud, product liability3 and
other litigation involving hundreds - or even thousands - of claimants,
several defendants, and very complicated issues.
In a time when numerous American corporations manufacture, market
and distribute their products, offer their services, and engage in diverse
business practices throughout the world, they have also become a target of
many lawsuits arising from the injuries, damages and economic losses
caused by their products, and U.S. courts have become the likely forum to
process these suits. 4  The cases that capture the most attention are those
1. See Symposium, Implied "Consent" to Personal Jurisdiction in Transnational Class
Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 619, 625 ("In particular, the class action device is unique;
most foreign nations do not have a similar procedure."); Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil - A
Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 311, 313 (2003) ("So far however, Quebec
and Brazil are the only civil law systems that have developed a sophisticated system of class
action suits."); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Debates Over Group Litigation in Comparative Perspective:
What Can We Learn From Each Other?, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT. L. 157, 159 (2001) ("Some
forms of class actions have been adopted in a few Canadian provinces, in Australia, and in
Brazil.").
2. Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster. New Myths and Realities of Class Action
and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 Duke J. Comp. & Int. L. 179, 182 (2001) [hereinafter
Revisiting the Monster].
3. Id. at 183 (Even though "mass torts arose in the United States in an era when class
certification generally was not deemed appropriate for such litigation.").
4. WARREN FREEDMAN, PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS BY FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS IN THE
UNITED STATES 1 (Kluwer Law & Tax'n 1988) ("The United States is indeed the mecca or El
Dorado for injured plaintiffs because the American tort system is geared to full recognition of the
rights of consumers. The rule of liability is liberal; there is procedural ease in serving defendants,
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related to accidents and others related to personal injury and property
damage.
One of the advantages of the American legal system is that it offers a
means of collectively prosecuting cases - through class action and other
aggregation - that are not feasible to be tried on an individual basis. 6 Most
Latin American countries, aside from Brazil, 7 do not have a system in place
to deal with collective actions. As a result, some Latin American claimants
try to find ways of bringing their cases to American courts. Even though
there is no data available to show how many foreign claimants have been
involved in collective litigation in U.S. courts in the last decade, the
presence of foreign citizens as parties in complex cases is becoming more
common, but interestingly enough, not much attention has been given to
them.8
This article represents an effort to understand some aspects
surrounding the involvement of foreign claimants in collective litigation in
the U.S. through the study of the Ford-Firestone rollover litigation. This
case exhibits features that today are common to most product liability
claims: a product designed or fabricated in the U.S. by an American
corporation was marketed overseas, accidents occurred in other countries
(as well as in the U.S.), and foreign victims chose to bring their claims to
American courts instead of processing them in the jurisdictions where the
accidents took place. Conversely, the defendant corporations have put all
their efforts in having the cases dismissed in the U.S. and sent back to be
tried in their countries of origin.
Of particular interest are the strategic reasons why Latin American
disputants decided to file their claims in the U.S. instead of their countries
of origin - where the accidents occurred - and the obstacles that they faced
as well as the possible incentives of the American defendant corporations to
prefer litigating in other fora. Interviews with several leading plaintiff and
in obtaining pre-trial discovery, and in promoting the jury system to answer questions of fact, inter
alia, all of which characteristics appeal to plaintiffs everywhere.").
5. Deborah R. Hensler, The Role of Multi-Districting in Mass Tort Litigation: An Empirical
Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 833, 833 (2001) ("For example, massive lawsuits against
manufacturers of asbestos, dietary supplements, medical devices, pharmaceutical products, and
tobacco are front-page news.").
6. However, the public image of class litigation tends to be negative. Revisiting the
Monster, supra note 2, at 180. ("Some believe that American courts are overrun with class
litigation - a phenomenon that is about to inundate the courts of other countries as well. Many
ordinary Americans seem to think that class actions are a new-fangled litigation device invented
by greedy plaintiff attorneys.")
7. See sources cited supra note 1 and accompanying text.
8. Symposium, supra note 1, at 619 ("Surprisingly little attention has been paid to the
special problem ofnon-U.S. class members' participation in U.S.-situated class litigation.").
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defense attorneys provided some of the most valuable sources of
information about some critical aspects of the case and about the strategic
reasons taken into account by Venezuelan claimants who bring their claims
in the U.S.. 9
This article concludes that litigants, like migratory birds, travel north or
south in search of an advantageous venue. Part II offers an overview of the
origins and development of the Ford-Firestone rollover litigation, from the
initial involvement of governmental agencies in the U.S. as well as in
Venezuela, to the filing of claims in American courts and the collection
under the Multi-District Litigation scheme. Part III describes the
circumstances surrounding foreign claimants, from the initial filing of their
lawsuits to the reasons why they chose to litigate in the U.S., the obstacles
they faced, and conversely, the incentives for the defendant companies to
litigate in Latin America. Part IV concludes that as has business itself,
forum shopping, or seeking the most advantageous venue in which to try a
case, has gone global.
II. THE FORD-FIRESTONE ROLLOVER LITIGATION: ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT
Ford Motor Corporation and Firestone, Inc. 10 had been doing business
together in the automotive industry for nearly a century." Over the years,
Ford Motors sold many of its models with Firestone tires as part of its
original equipment ("OE").12 In 1990 Ford began to produce its Explorer
9. All the interviews were done under the promise of confidentiality, so the names of the
interviewees are omitted. Instead, the interviewees are identified with numbers, e.g., Plaintiff
Attorney # 1, Plaintiff Attorney #2, and so forth.
10. Firestone, Inc. (originally, the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company) was founded in 1900
by Harvey Firestone in Akron, Ohio. The company was bought in 1988 by the Japanese tire
maker Bridgestone Corporation, becoming as a result the world's largest tire and rubber company.
Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc., A Brief History of Bridgestone Americas, at:
http://www.bridgestone-firestone.com/about/indexhistory.asp?id=bfhistory (last visited Feb. 22,
2005).
11. Harvey Firestone and Henry Ford, two famous industrial titans of the early automotive
industry, began their business partnership in 1906 when Ford partnered with Firestone to make
tires for his cars. From that date on, Firestone would become Ford's main provider of tires. For a
comprehensive history of the early years of the business relationship between Ford and Firestone,
see BRINKLEY DOUGLAS, WHEELS FOR THE WORLD: HENRY FORD, HIS COMPANY, AND A
CENTURY OF PROGRESS 738-739 (Penguin Books 2003); ALFRED LIEF, THE FIRESTONE STORY:
A HISTORY OF THE FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY 30-31 (McGraw-Hill 1951).
12. The original equipment market (OEM) is one of the two markets served by the tire
industry. The other is the replacement market (RM). The OEM is a low-profit, but very
important, market "because it provides large orders (and hence the scale) as well as the prospect
for future replacement sales (car owners typically replace tires with the same original equipment
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sport utility vehicle ("SUV") and equipped it with the Firestone fifteen-inch
ATX tires. 13  The Explorer would become the most popular Ford SUV,
selling more than three million units worldwide during the following ten
years.14 Approximately 60 million Firestone ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness
Tires were sold worldwide. 15 But in the late 1990s the success story of the
Ford/Firestone alliance was about to end as a result of the enormous crisis
that resulted from hundreds of lawsuits brought all over the U.S. against
both companies after the occurrence of rollover accidents involving Ford
Explorers and allegedly faulty Firestone tires.
A. The Origins of the Case
One of the first steps toward the formation of a multimillion dollar case
against Ford and Firestone was the 1998 report prepared by U.S.-based
State Farm Insurance,' 6 noting that Ford Explorer vehicles equipped with
Firestone/Bridgestone's ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness AT tires had an
unusual propensity to roll over and the tire belts to separate.' 7 At that time,
State Farm requested the intervention of the National Highway
Transportation Safety Administration ("NHTSA"), but this agency did not
become involved until 2000, when an investigation was launched after the
filing of many claims by consumers.
1 8
During the hearings held before the House Commerce Committee in
September 2000, State Farm representatives expressed that their company's
brand)." See Raghuram Rajan et al., The Eclipse of the U.S. Tire Industry, in NBER CONF.
REPORT MERGERS AND PRODUCTIVITY 51-86 (Steven N. Kaplan, ed. 2000).
13. Kevin M. McDonald, Don't TREAD on Me: Faster Than a Tire Blowout, Congress
Passes Wide-Sweeping Legislation That Treads on the Thirty-Five Year Old Motor Vehicle Safety
Act, 49 BUFF. L. REv. 1163, 1171 (2001) [hereinafter Don't Tread on Me]. Even though ATX
tires were the most common model, other tires such as the ATX II (introduced in 1995), and the
Wilderness AT (introduced in 1996) were also part of the Explorer OE. Id.
14. Id. The Explorer would also become Ford's most profitable model, each sale
representing $10,000 in gross profit and $4,000 in operating profit to the company. Id. at 1171 n.
31.
15. Tire Recalls, CBSNEWS.COM , at http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/tires/timeline.html
(last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
16. Bridgestone/Firestone Inc. Tire Recall: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Com. Oversight
& Investigations, 106th Cong. (2000) (prepared statement of Samuel K. Boyden, Associate
Research Administrator, State Farm Ins. Co.), available at
http://www.statefarm.com/media/release/tires.htm#testimony [hereinafter State Farm Testimony].
17. Belt edge separation and belt-leaving-belt separation. This normally occurs "when the
tread and one steel belt separate from the other steel belt." See Don't Tread on Me, supra note 13,
at 1172.
18. Standards Enforcement and Defect Investigation; Defect and Noncompliance Reports;
Record Retention, 66 Fed. Reg. 14 at 6533 (Jan. 22, 2001) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 554,
573, and 576) [hereinafter The NHTSA Report].
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main interest in promoting this investigation was the concern about safety
issues, and described the many public policy initiatives of the company in
this regard during the last forty years.' 9 They also indicated that while State
Farm is not a safety regulator, one of the top priorities of the company "is to
promote improved vehicle and highway safety."
20
However, in the Congressional hearing's transcripts, another possible
interest, perhaps equally legitimate, but no doubt less altruistic, was
revealed: State Farm has been, for many years, the nation's leading vehicle
insurer "with 37 million policies and one out of every five cars insured.'
As mentioned during the hearings, from 1991 to 1998, State Farm got an
unusually large number of claims from accidents involving Ford SUV
rollovers, which obviously represented an important financial burden for
22the company. As a result, State Farm had a primary business interest in
this issue, because if defects in the manufacturing of vehicles and tires were
discovered, State Farm could seek compensation from Ford and Firestone,
and perhaps lead policyholders to do the same instead of targeting insurance
companies with their claims.
State Farm needed the help of regulatory agencies like the NHTSA to
investigate the possible defects of vehicles and tires, so that if defects were
found, State Farm could hold Ford and Firestone liable. Insurers are an
interesting group who might have a stake in this litigation, since the
occurrence of rollovers made them disburse significant amounts of money
as a result of insurance policies' coverage.23
Accidents involving Ford Explorers equipped with Firestone tires were
reported in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia) and South America (Colombia,
Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador).24  In Venezuela, the Consumer
Protection Agency ("INDECU") initiated an inquiry concerning 104
individual claims filed by the victims of accidents involving Ford Explorers
19. Congressional hearings involved two State Farm employees, the Associate General
Counsel, and the Associate Research Administrator. Both gave testimony before the House
Commerce Committee Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection
and Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on September 6, 2000. See State Farm
Testimony, supra note 16.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. One of our interviewees mentioned that during 2002, some insurance companies tried to
line up with plaintiffs, and worked to organize a class, but it did not seem to work. Apparently, no
insurance company has filed a lawsuit so far, at least, at the federal level. Telephone interview
with Plaintiff Attorney #1 (Mar. 25, 2003).
24. NHTSA Investigating Failure Of Firestone Brand Tires, at
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/US/08/03/tire.investigation/ (August 3, 2000).
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equipped with ATX and Wilderness Firestone tires.
On August 31, 2000, as a result of an extensive research, INDECU
concluded that Ford and Firestone withheld critical information to
Venezuelan consumers about certain defects in Ford Explorers as well as in
Firestone ATX and Wilderness tires.26 The report suggested such defects to
be the cause of the accidents.27 Consequently, INDECU ordered Ford to
recall Explorer vehicles and replace their suspension systems as well as the
Firestone tires that were installed in them.28 Firestone was ordered to recall
the models of tires involved the accidents. 29 As for those who had already
suffered harm or had lost their lives in accidents involving Ford Explorers
and Firestone tires, INDECU recommended the filing of legal actions in
courts .3 0
The case started to get public attention,31 prompting the Venezuelan
32Congress to appoint a Commission to investigate Ford and Firestone.
Through these actions, the Venezuelan government threatened to impose
administrative sanctions against Ford and Firestone.33 The most severe
proposed sanction consisted of banning the sale of Ford vehicles in
Venezuela, which would also have direct effects on Ford's South American
25. Instituto para la Defensa y Educaci6n del Consumidor y del Usuario (INDECU), Informe
del INDECU entregado a la Fiscalia General de la Reptiblica [Report submitted to the General
Attorney's Office], at 1(2000) [hereinafter The Indecu Report].
26. Id. at 2.
27. Id. at 5.
28. The prior year, Ford had voluntarily replaced the tires of 6,768 Explorer SUV sold in
Saudi Arabia. In February 2000, Ford did the same in Malaysia and Taiwan, but Firestone denied
any defect in its tires. Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Firestone/Ford Fiasco Timeline
& Internal Decisions, at http://www.atla.org/homepage/firereca.pdf (last visited Feb. 15 2005).
29. At about that same time, Firestone started to recall ATX tires in the U.S. but the company
insisted that it was part of a customer's satisfaction program, and not as a result of any defect in
the tires. See Zeroing In On The Explorer, CBSNEWS.COM at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2000/08/02/national/main22 Il I0.shtml (Aug. 2, 2000).
30. The Indecu was enjoined from imposing on Ford and Firestone other sanctions than fines
for violating consumer rights. According to the Venezuelan Consumer Protection Act, any action
seeking compensation of damages has to be pursued through courts. See LEY DE PROTECCION AL
CONSUMIDOR Y AL USUARIO [LPCU] [Consumer and User Protection Act] art. 142, 152 (Venez.).
31. See Ford y Firestone en el Banquillo [Ford and Firestone on the accused's bench],
PRODUCTO ON LINE, at http://www.producto.com.ve/204/notas/ford.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2005); Informe Ford-Firestone qued6 para Septiembre [report Ford-Firestone left for September],
NOTITARDE.COM, at http://historico.notitarde.com/2002/08/09/economia/economia3.html (Aug.
9, 2002).
32. Comision Permanente de Administracion y Servicios Publicos de la Asamblea Nacional,
Informe sobre el caso Ford-Firestone [Report on the Ford-Firestone case] at 2 (2002) [hereinafter
The National Assembly's Report].
33. Id.
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market.34  After intense negotiations, Ford and Firestone reached a
settlement with the regulatory agencies avoiding the sanctions.35  Even
though oriented to protect the public interest,36 none of these governmental
actions was intended to compensate those who had already suffered
physical harm or the relatives of those who were killed in accidents
involving Ford Explorers and Firestone ATX and Wilderness tires.37
Victims sought an economic compensation, and even though the steps taken
by governmental agencies helped their case, and perhaps created pressure
on Ford and Firestone, it did not fulfill their expectations.
About the same time, the U.S. House Commerce Committee 38 initiated
an extensive inquiry, which "determined that NHTSA could have detected
the problems with the tires sooner if it had obtained reports about the tires'
problems in a timelier manner., 39 A direct result of this investigation was
the drafting and implementation of The Transportation Recall
Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation ("TREAD") Act.40 The
TREAD Act, established a series of provisions requiring vehicles and parts
manufacturers: (i) to report periodically to the NHTSA information about
potential safety recalls, 41 (ii) to devise a plan "that prevents replaced tires
from being resold for use on motor vehicles, 42 (iii) to "advise NHTSA of
foreign safety recalls and other safety campaigns.' It also increased civil
penalties for violations of the vehicle safety law and established "criminal
penalties for misleading the Secretary [of Transportation] about safety
34. The imposition of such a sanction would be particularly damaging to Ford Motor
Company, due to its important share in the South American automotive market (69.7% of the total
volume of vehicles). Fordy Firestone en el Banquillo, supra note 3 1.
35. Interview with Defense Attorney #2 in Caracas, Venez. (Feb. 13, 2003).
36. LEY DE PROTECCION AL CONSUMIDOR Y AL USUARIO [LPCU] [Consumer and User
Protection Act] art. 1 (Venez.).
37. In fact, pursuant to the LPCU, the Indecu can only impose administrative sanctions
against those who breach any of its provisions. Any claims seeking compensation for injuries or
damages, need to be filed separately in court. See id.
38. Ford Motor Company's Recall of Certain Firestone Tires: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Com., Trade, & Consumer Protection & Oversight & Investigations of the Committee on
Energy & Com. House of Representatives, 107th Cong. 107-45 (2001) [hereinafter 2001
Congressional Hearing].
39. Id.
40. Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Document ("TREAD") Act,
Pub. L: 106-414, 114 Stat. 1800 (2000) (codified in 49 U.S.C.). For a comprehensive analysis of
the TREAD Act see McDonald, supra note 14; see also Kevin M. McDonald, Separations, Blow-
Outs, and Fallout: A Treadise on the Regulatory Aftermath of the Ford-Firestone Tire Recall, 37
J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1073 (2004).
41. See 49 U.S.C. § 30166 (2000).
42. See 49 U.S.C. § 30120(d) (2000).
43. See 49 U.S.C. § 30166.
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defects that have caused death or injury."44  Finally, it gave extensive
powers to the Secretary of Transportation to conduct rulemaking actions in
order to improve safety standards for vehicles and tires.45
B. The Litigation Starts
Soon after the first reports suggesting possible defects in Ford SUVs
equipped with Firestone tires, plaintiffs started filing lawsuits in different
state and federal courts throughout the U.S..46 The majority were personal
injury claims from victims or their relatives, but others were only related to
the apparent economic loss that Ford SUV owners had suffered because of
an alleged decrease in the value of their vehicles.47
One of the most interesting aspects is that many of the lawsuits
involved foreign claimants - the majority from Venezuela 48 - who brought
legal actions to U.S. courts instead of filing them in the countries where the
accidents or losses occurred.49
Almost immediately after the INDECU issued its report on August 31,
2000 concluding that Ford and Firestone had intentionally conspired against
consumers 50 and urging owners of Ford vehicles and Firestone tires to file
lawsuits against both companies,5' Venezuelan claimants began initiating
legal proceedings.52 The occurrence of numerous accidents in other
countries helped the U.S. plaintiffs' bar build its case based on the idea that
Ford and Firestone conspired to conceal the dangers of their products,
therefore causing an enormous harm to consumers.53 Instead of filing
44. See TREAD Act § 5(b).
45. See TREAD Act § 15.
46. U.S. courts started issuing protective orders as a result of accidents involving Ford
Explorer SUVs as early as 1995, but the bulk of the litigation occurred in 2000. See
Firestone/Ford Fiasco Timeline & Internal Decisions, supra note 28.
47. Plaintiffs Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 3, Benford v. Bridgestone
Corporation and Ford Motor Company (N.D. Ill. 2000) (No. 00 C 5406) [hereinafter Benford class
action].
48. Forty-six deadly accidents were reported in Venezuela, making it the country with the
highest number of fatalities outside the U.S. where one hundred and one people had lost their lives
in accidents involving Ford Explorers with Firestone Tires. See Firestone, Ford threatened with
Venezuelan legal actions, CNN.cOM, at
http://cgi.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/americas/O9/30/venezuela.tire.deaths/ (March 27, 2000).
49. Based on both a comprehensive review of Venezuelan court filing reports and interviews
with the several attorneys from both sides, the author verified that aside from the claims filed with
the Consumer Protection Agency, no legal actions were initiated in Venezuelan courts.
50. The Indecu Report, supra note 25, at 9.
51. Id.
52. Telephone interview with Plaintiff Attorney #3 (Mar. 15, 2003).
53. Id.
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lawsuits in their own country, Venezualan victims and their families
contacted U.S. law firms through their local counsel, and individual actions
were brought on their behalf.54 During this period, for example, at least ten
lawsuits were filed in the Southern District of Florida.55
In other cases, Venezuelan counsel devised sophisticated methods of
organizing groups of victims, by screening the cases, gathering and
organizing potential evidence, and then classifying the victims according to
the seriousness of the harm or loss, the amount of the claim and other
criteria.56 These "packages" of cases were then referred to a U.S. plaintiff
firm in be filed and tried in federal courts. This method was used to prepare
the first class action involving foreign claimants, filed at the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois and then transferred to a Multidistrict
Litigation ("MDL") judge.5 7  Class actions and individual lawsuits
involving only U.S. citizens were also filed in both federal and state courts.
In total, approximately two hundred foreign cases were filed in federal
courts and became part of the MDL docket.5
During this first stage Ford and Firestone made efforts to keep court
cases at a very low profile and the media coverage at a minimum. The two
companies began to settle most of the domestic cases but were reluctant to
do so with the ones involving foreign claimants,59 on the apparent grounds
that settling these actions could be interpreted as an admission of guilt and
used against Ford and Firestone in pending criminal investigations
involving their executives in Venezuela.6 °
C. The Transfer of Cases by the Panel of Multidistrict Litigation
By October 2000, there were at least sixty-three actions initiated in
thirty different federal courts, 61 all related to alleged defects in Ford
54. Id.
55. Interview with Plaintiff Attorney #4 in Caracas, Venez. (Jan. 22, 2003).
56. A common way of organizing plaintiffs consisted in forming groups of consumers under
the veil of civil associations (asociaciones civiles), which, under Venezuelan law [C.C. art. 19],
may initiate legal actions on behalf of its members. The most common group formed was the
Asociacion de Propietarios de Ford Explorer [Association of Ford Explorer owners]. Interview
with Plaintiff Attorney #2 in Miami, Fla. (April 2, 2003).
57. Interview with Plaintiff Attorney #4 in Caracas, Venez. (Jan. 28, 2003).
58. Telephone Interview with Plaintiff Attorney #1 (Jan. 10, 2003).
59. See supra note 49.
60. Interview with Defense Attorney #1 in Caracas, Venez. (Jan. 25, 2003).
61. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness Tires Prods. Liab. Litig.,
No. 1373, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15926, at *1 (J.P.M.L. Oct.' 24, 2000) (transfer order)
[hereinafter ADL transfer order] (The Southern District of Florida had ten cases and the Middle
District of Tennessee had six cases. The Northern District of Illinois and the Southern District of
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vehicles equipped with Firestone tires. At least three of them were filed as
class actions,62 but only the Benford class action involved foreign
claimants.63 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL Panel")
received petitions to transfer these actions to one Court for consolidated
pretrial proceedings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407.64
Even though both parties generally favored the transfer and collection
of cases by the MDL Panel, defendant Ford Motor Company played the
most active role in consolidating the litigation into one federal court by
requesting the centralization of most of the actions in the Central District of
Illinois.65 In addition to supporting the transfer of cases by the MDL Panel,
the defendants tried to move actions pending in state courts to federal
courts, but that tactic was not successful.6 6 When screening the cases to be
transferred, the MDL panel remanded four of the class actions to state
courts 67 on the grounds that no federal question was involved in any of
them.68
Objections against the MDL came from some plaintiffs who contended
either "that actions removed by Firestone or Ford from state to federal court
should be excluded from transfer because there [was] no federal
jurisdiction, 69 or "that actions brought on behalf of persons injured or
killed in accidents related to the defective tires should not be centralized or
Texas both had five cases. The Middle District of Florida, the Southern District of Illinois and the
Eastern District of Louisiana each had three cases. The following districts had one case each: the
Central District of Illinois, the District of Maryland, the District of Massachusetts, the District of
New Mexico and the Southern District of Ohio all had two cases within their jurisdictions. The
Western District of Arkansas, the Southern District of California, the Middle District of
California, the Northern District of California, the District of Columbia, the Western District of
Louisiana, the Middle District of Louisiana, the Eastern District of Michigan, the Southern
District of Mississippi, the Western District of Missouri, the District of New Jersey, the Eastern
District of Oklahoma, the Western District of Oklahoma, the District of Rhode Island, the Eastern
District of Texas, the Western District of Texas, the Northern District of Texas and the Southern
District of West Virginia).
62. Id. at 2 (In the Middle District of Tennessee, the Louridas class action involved only U.S.
citizens. In the Northern District of Illinois, the Benford class action involved both U.S. and
foreign citizens. In the Southern District of Texas, the Stallone class action, involving only U.S.
citizens, was originally filed in state court, but was later moved to federal court).
63. Benford class action, supra note 47, at 1.
64. MDL transfer order, supra note 61, at 2.
65. Forty-seven cases were consolidated. Id.
66. Telephone interview with Defense Attorney #1 (Feb. 12, 2003).
67. MDL transfer order, supra note 61, at 3.
68. In spite of the defendants' insistence in trying to move actions from state to federal
courts, the MDL judge continuously rejected such petitions or remanded to state courts those cases
that could not get into the MDL. Plaintiff Attorney #4, supra note 57.
69. MDL transfer order, supra note 61, at 2.
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should be centralized separately from the other MDL-1373 actions. 70
Those plaintiffs who supported the transfer request suggested different
jurisdictions for the collection of cases: the Southern District of Illinois (six
actions) and the Middle District of Tennessee (four actions). 71 Evidently,
no strategy was followed by the plaintiffs' bar in regards to the transfer for
MDL proceedings.
On October 24, 2000, the MDL Panel ordered the transfer of all federal
court cases to a jurisdiction that no party had requested, the Southern
District of Indiana, and appointed Judge Barker as the transferee judge to
conduct pretrial proceedings.72 The decision to select the District Court of
the Southern District of Indiana as the MDL court was made by the judicial
panel after considering "the range of locations of parties and witnesses in
this docket and the geographic dispersal of constituent actions. 73
In the decision to transfer the actions, the panel acknowledged "the
pendency of more than 90 additional, potentially related actions pending in
federal district courts, 74 and anticipated its treatment as tag-along actions.
By the end of 2003, approximately nine hundred federal cases were either
transferred or filed directly in the MDL court, seven hundred involving
domestic plaintiffs, two hundred foreign claimants, 75 and fifty class actions
involving both types of claimants.76
D. Class Certification
Soon after the case consolidation, and as an effort "to prevent retransfer
to the originating districts for decision on the merits, 77 a group of U.S.
plaintiffs filed a consolidated suit before the MDL judge and filed a motion
requesting certification of a nationwide "hybrid" class pursuant to Federal
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 5.
73. Id. at 8.
74. Id. at 3.
75. The lead counsel for plaintiffs estimated foreign claims of $750 million in damages
against Ford and Firestone. See Matthew Haggman, Broward Jury Finds Against Bridgestone,
DAILY BUS. REv., Feb. 11, 1003, at A8. None of the informants could give a monetary estimate
of domestic claims.
76. The MDL court did not classify the cases as domestic and foreign, but instead as subject
or not subject to forum non conveniens' motions. Most foreign claims were filed as individual
cases, and to the best of knowledge, the Benford class action is the one involving foreign
plaintiffs. MDL transfer order, supra note 61, at 4.
77. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir.
2002).
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Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). s8 This move represented an
interesting shift in strategies, since the majority of the plaintiff bar was
opposed to centralizing the federal cases.
The certification request was based on breach of warranty and unjust
enrichment claims,79 thus excluding personal injury and wrongful death
claims. After partially granting plaintiffs' requests, 0 the district court
certified the following two nationwide classes and sub-class, involving only
domestic plaintiffs:
8
'
1) Explorer Class: Current residents of the U.S. who owned or leased
Ford Explorer SUV from 1991 to 2001;
Explorer Sub-class: Current residents of the U.S. who purchased,
owned, or leased Ford Explorer SUVs that are or were equipped with Tires
(as defined in the Tire Class) from 1991 to 2001;
2) Tire Class: Those who owned or leased vehicles equipped with any
of six different types of Firestone Tires from 1991 to 2001.
The district court also decided, under Indiana choice-of-law rules, that
Michigan law would apply to the class plaintiffs' claims against Firestone,
while Tennessee law would apply to the cases against Ford, because these
jurisdictions are the locations of defendants' corporate headquarters. 2
Foreign claimants did not join the class certification efforts, since they
considered it more convenient to litigate these cases on an individual
basis.8 3 However, some Venezuelan plaintiffs did file their claims as part of
the Benford class action originally presented before the Circuit Court of the
Northern District of Illinois, which entailed breach of warranty and
financial loss claims instead of personal injury or wrongful death claims.8 4
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) & 23(b)(3).
79. Plaintiffs contended that defendants breached express and implied warranties because of
failure to repair or replace defective products, and that selling defective Explorers and tires for the
price of non-defective Explorers and tires unjustly enriched defendants. In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 503 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (order
granting motion for class certification and ruling on related matters).
80. Id. at 534.
81. Id. at508.
82. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 155 F. Supp. 2d. 1069, 1077
(S.D. Ind. 2001).
83. Plaintiff Attorney #1, supra note 58. However, more than half of the foreign cases were
handled by two law firms and were originally filed in the same court of the Southern District of
Florida, which for practical matters functions as if the cases were collected. Attorneys from the
two firms that represent almost 140 victims serve as lead counsel for the plaintiffs. Id.
84. This case only involved financial claims. The plaintiffs argued that the propensity of the
their respective SUVs to roll over, aside from posing a safety risk, diminished the market value of
their SUVs, which translated to a financial loss. With respect to the Firestone/Bridgestone tires,
plaintiffs argued that the defected tires made the tires obsolete, thus entitling plaintiffs the right to
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III. FOREIGN CLAIMANTS IN U.S. COURTS: THE REASONS FOR THEIR
CHOICE OF FORUM AND THE OBSTACLES THEY FACED
Even though foreign claimants did not represent the majority of
plaintiffs in the Ford/Firestone rollovers litigation,8 5 their presence played
an important role in shaping the case. The occurrence of foreign accidents,
and the way in which Ford and Firestone handled consumer complaints,
reinforced plaintiffs' argument that defendants engaged in a conspiracy.
The scandal resulting from the accidents in Venezuela also helped secure
media attention86 and was a key element during the Congressional
investigation in the U.S.87 In addition, the presence of foreign claimants
affected the ways in which other plaintiffs and defendants devised their
strategies for the case.
As previously noted, South American victims did not file lawsuits in
their respective countries where the accidents occurred, but instead brought
their suits directly in U.S. courts. However, when analyzing the adequacy
of Colombia as an alternative forum, the MDL judge made reference to
some verbal proceedings brought before Colombian civil circuit judges
against Ford Motors de Venezuela, S.A.8"
A. Forum Non Conveniens Motion and its Outcome
In December 2000, soon after the MDL docket collected a significant
number of foreign cases, defendants sought dismissal on the basis of forum
non conveniens, arguing that these lawsuits had to be tried in Venezuela and
Colombia because the courts of those countries were adequate alternative
fora.89
recover the money invested in the original tire purchases. See Plaintiffs Second Amended Class
Action Compl. at 3, Benford et. al. v. Bridgestone Corp. and Ford Motor Co., No. 00 C 5406
(N.D. Ill. 2000).
85. As mentioned previously, until mid-2001 the MDL court had approximately nine hundred
cases in its docket, of which only two hundred involved foreign claimants. Tire Recalls, supra
note 15. Only a handful of these foreign cases involving Mexican victims were tried in Texas and
Tennessee's state courts. Plaintiff Attorney #1, supra note 58.
86. Tire Recalls, supra note 15; see also Plaintiff's Second Amended Class Action Compl. at
3, Benford et. al. (No. 00 C 5406).
87. 2001 Congressional Hearing, supra note 38, at 5.
88. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 190 F.Supp. 2d. 1125 (S.D.
Ind. 2001). Verbal proceedings are indeed of judicial nature. Article 427 of the Columbian Code
of Civil Procedure includes consumer protection actions for those that can be resolved through a
summary oral trial. C6D. PROC. Civ. art 427 (Col. 1993). The outcome of these proceedings is
unknown; however, from their mention in the MDL opinion, it seems they may have been
dismissed without resolution.
89. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 190 F.Supp. 2d at 1128-30.
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The plaintiffs countered that, on the basis of certain treaty obligations,
the Colombian9" and Venezuelan citizens 9' were entitled to a presumption
of convenience equal to that of resident or citizen plaintiffs. According to
these treaties, the courts of both countries shall be open and free to the
other's citizens "on the same terms which are usual and customary with the
natives or citizens of the country in which they may be."
92
After extensive discovery, on March 25, 2002 the MDL judge issued
an order denying the motions to dismiss. 93 In her ruling, Judge Barker
made clear that even though her order only referred to 121 Colombian and
Venezuelan cases, "the parties should take its implications into account
when determining their strategies in the remaining cases.
94
In deciding the motion, the judge was guided by a two-step analysis:
(a) to determine if Venezuela and Colombia were adequate alternative fora
to hear the cases, and (b) to balance the various public and private interest
factors to establish if their weight favored dismissal. Even though most of
the arguments presented were common to Venezuela and Colombia, some
differences were discussed. In any case, the outcome was the same for
both: U.S. courts retained jurisdiction over the cases. 95
B. Strategy Behind Foreign Plaintiffs'Decision to Litigate in the U.S.
In addition to the legal arguments already described, interviews with
foreign plaintiffs attorneys revealed the strategy behind choosing to sue
Ford and Firestone in the U.S. rather than Colombia or Venezuela.
1. Potential for Bigger Awards in the U.S.
The factor that seemed to have the most weight in deciding to bring a
lawsuit to the U.S. was the potential to obtain a larger award. The general
perception of the interviewees was that U.S. courts are more generous in
awarding damages than their Venezuelan and Colombian counterparts.9 6
90. Convention of Peace, Amity, Navigation, and Commerce, May 31, 1825, U.S.-Colum., 8
Stat. 306.
91. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Navigation, and Commerce, June 20, 1836, U.S.-Venez., 8
Stat. 466.
92. Id. at 472.
93. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 190 F.Supp. 2d at 1126, 1156.
94. Id. at 1128.
95. Id. at 1156. An interesting analysis of the possible outcome of the forum non conveniens
motions in this case was the focus of an article by Douglas A. Praw. Douglas A. Praw, Venezuela
v. Ford Motor Company: The Trend of Dismissing Mass Tort Cases on Grounds of Forum Non
Conveniens, 8 S.W. J. L. & TRADE AM. 373 (2001-02).
96. Some interviewees based this assertion merely on anecdotal evidence. Only favorable
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But, even if awards were comparable, plaintiff attorneys still prefer to be
compensated in U.S. dollars than in local currency, which is vulnerable to
devaluation on a constant basis, most dramatically in Venezuela.97
Litigating in the U.S. is a way to protect foreign plaintiffs against
devaluation and maintain the current value of awards. 98 Conversely, this
factor affects defendants negatively.
2. Possibility of Retaining U.S. Counsel on a Contingency Fee Basis
Another factor mentioned as an incentive to file lawsuits in U.S. courts
was the possibility of retaining attorneys on a contingency fee basis,
99
which is generally prohibited in Latin America. According to one
interviewee, virtually no victim has the substantial amount of money that is
needed to prepare one of these cases.' 00 Therefore, the only way to proceed
is to agree on a contingency fee basis, and have the attorney cover all the
expenses related to the trial. Under Venezuelan law, any agreement by
which the attorney acquires a personal interest in the outcome of the case,
including paying litigation expenses and calculating his or her fee as a
percentage of the award, is illegal (pacto de cuota litis). '0  Attorneys fees
in Venezuela are still considered as honoraria. 102 Some trial attorneys and
clients frequently violate these rules and sign confidential agreements with
their clients stipulating that the fees will be based on contingency. But this
poses an enormous risk to the lawyer, because aside from jeopardizing his
or her license to practice law, if a conflict regarding fees arises between the
client and the lawyer, a court will deem the agreement invalid. 10 3 Such
examples of generous awards obtained in the U.S. were mentioned to illustrate the advantage of
this forum over those of Venezuela and Columbia. Plaintiff Attorney #3. supra note 50; Plaintiff
Attorney #4, supra note 55. Additionally, none of the interviewees knew of any awards obtained
from South American courts in personal injury cases that could be cited in comparison. Therefore,
it is impossible to know whether the perception that U.S. courts are more generous than
Venezuelan or Columbian counterparts reflects reality. However, for plaintiffs the advantages of
litigating in the U.S. seems to be an uncontested truth.
97. "[T]he Venezuelan currency ('Bolivar' or 'Bs.') has devalued significantly during the last
decade." Horacio E. Guiterrez-Machado, The Personal Property Secured Financing System of
Venezuela: A Comparative Study and the Case for Harmonization, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L.
REV. 343, 355 (1998).
98. Interview with Plaintiff Attorney #2 in Miami, Fla. (Feb. 5, 2003).
99. "The contingency fee is one of the defining characteristics of civil litigation in the United
States." Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice,
47 DEPAuL L. REV. 267, 267 (1998).
100. Plaintiff Attorney #1, supra note 58.
101. COD. Civ. art 1482 (Venez. 1982). -
102. COD. ETICA DEL ABOGADO VENEZOLANO art. 39 (Venez. 1985).
103. Id., supra note 101.
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limitation makes it difficult for clients to find lawyers willing to undertake
their cases on a contingency basis in Venezuela.
3. No British Rule Regarding Award of Fees in the U.S.
Another incentive relates to the award of attorneys' fees. In contrast to
what occurs in the U.S., where pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505, courts have the
discretion of awarding the fees to the prevailing party, in Venezuela and
Colombia - as in most civil law countries - attorneys' fees are awarded
automatically to whoever prevails (in accordance with the so-called
English, or loser-pays, rule). 10 4  Some interviewees think that the U.S.
system relieves pressure on plaintiffs, therefore making plaintiffs' suits
more attractive in the U.S.'05
C. Obstacles that Foreign Plaintiffs Face in the U.S.
Interviewees in this litigation were also asked to discuss the possible
obstacles posed against Venezuelan and Colombian parties by litigating in
the U.S. Interestingly, the American attorneys interviewed felt the foreign
plaintiffs had faced no serious obstacles, aside from the defendants' motion
to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. 10 6 On the other hand, the
Venezuelan attorneys involved in the case identified at least three practical
obstacles, discussed below.
1. Little or No Involvement of the Client in Critical Decisions and
No Direct Communication between the Client and U.S. Counsel
As earlier explained, in most foreign cases U.S. counsel were retained
by the Venezuelan attorneys, and not directly by the clients. One of the
interviewees acknowledged not having met in person most of his
Venezuelan clients.' 0 7  All communications are channeled trough the
Venezuelan counsel, and important decisions are made using this system.1
0 8
Managing cases in such a way requires a high level of transparency and
coordination between the client and the attorneys. No conflicts have arisen
so far in relation to this, but there is a constant concern when clients do not
104. C6D. PROC. Civ. art. 274 (Venez. 1986); C6D. PROC. CIV. art. 389 (Col. 1970).
105. For an interesting analysis regarding fee shifting in class actions, see generally Thomas
D. Rowe, Jr., Shift Happens: Pressure on Foreign Attorney-Fee Paradigms from Class Actions,
13 DUKE J. COMP.& INT'L L. 125 (2003).
106. Plaintiff Attorney #1, supra note 58; Plaintiff Attorney #3, supra note 52.
107. Plaintiff Attorney #4, supra note 55.
108. Id.
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have a direct communication with the acting attorney. 109
2. Foreign Cases are Screened More Heavily than Domestic Cases
One of our interviewees indicated foreign plaintiffs are screened more
heavily than domestic plaintiffs because any lawyer who is willing to
undertake a foreign case has to take into consideration the elevated costs of
gathering and bringing evidence to the U.S. For example, some vehicles
and tires had to be shipped from Venezuela in order to be available as
evidence for the trial, and witnesses needed to be flown in."0 In addition,
because U.S. attorneys took these cases on a contingency fee basis, the
screening process was very important. Plaintiff attorneys scrutinize these
cases, and as a result "many of them have been rejected because the
evidence was deemed weak, or the potential award to get for them [was not]
worth the effort and the cost."' 11
3. U.S. Courts May Be Stricter in Analyzing the Facts
As indicated when describing the arguments presented by defendants to
support their forum non conveniens motions, one of the factors that the
court weighed as favoring dismissal was the appropriate exam of the
"driving conditions to which the vehicles and tires were subjected." ' 2 In
this respect the court acknowledged that local judges could assess these
issues more accurately than a U.S. judge, even more if it involved
allegations of tires and Vehicles being improperly serviced, as well as
negligent or reckless driving as causes for the rollovers. 1
3
In their joint reply to the plaintiffs' response, Ford and Firestone
expressed concern about the importance of viewing the accident scene for
some cases. 114 They also stated that "it would be difficult for an American
to imagine" conditions like "high speed driving over road conditions with
steep shoulders with sharp drop-offs."' 5 The MDL judge said that U.S.
courts could instead employ videotapes, or aerial photographs to determine
the real conditions of the roads and circumstances in which the accidents
109. Id.
110. Plaintiff Attorney #2, supra note 56.
111. Id.
112. In Re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 190 F.Supp. 2d 1125, 1141
(S.D. Ind. 2002).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1144.
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occurred. " 16
As the cases will be litigated in the U.S., the trial courts will have to
evaluate defendants' arguments about the victims' shared fault in their
accidents, and most likely, will use different standards than Venezuelan or
Colombian judges would. As the enforcement of traffic regulations in the
U.S. arguably is stricter than in Venezuela or Colombia, the judge may be
more severe than his or her Venezuelan or Colombian counterpart when
analyzing the negligence of plaintiffs and their contribution to the accidents.
4. Potential Incentives for Defendants if Cases Were Tried in South
America: The Two Faces of Judicial Inefficiency
One cannot conclude without commenting on the possible strategic
advantages that Ford and Firestone would have if the cases were tried in
Venezuela. As earlier mentioned, defendants dedicated important efforts
toward the dismissal of cases by U.S. courts, under the argument that
Venezuela and Colombia were the adequate fora to try those cases.
Defendants argued that "these cases should be tried in the countries in
which the accidents occurred, where the victims live, and where the
witnesses and the investigative authorities are located."
' 17
But are these the only reasons? One could assume that some of the
obstacles that Venezuelan and Colombian victims face in their countries
represent advantages to Ford and Firestone. If Venezuelan courts tend to
give smaller awards than their U.S. counterparts, it clearly benefits the
defendants because they can expect to pay less. If Venezuelan and
Colombian attorneys cannot be retained on a contingency basis it may also
benefit the defendants since only those victims who are able to cover trial
expenses will sue. By the same token, the existence of the "British rule"
system in regards to award of fees may deter risk-averse plaintiffs from
filing actions in Venezuela and Colombia. In addition, there are other
obstacles mentioned by plaintiffs (i.e. overall inefficiency of Venezuelan
courts), which one would assume are negative for any disputant, but may
turn out to be advantageous to some. Among the arguments presented to
persuade the MDL court to retain jurisdiction over foreign cases, plaintiffs
highlighted "the long delays plaguing the Venezuelan judicial system."'"18
Plaintiffs attorneys explained that according to the World Bank,
116. Id. at 1144-5.
117. See generally In Re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Prod. Liab. Litig., 190 F. Supp. 2d
1125 (2002).
118. Id. at 1153.
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Venezuelan courts had an estimated backlog of two to three million cases" 19
and suggested that trying these lawsuits in Venezuela would be difficult,
lengthy, and costly.12 0  While the objective of plaintiffs is to obtain an
"easy, expeditious, and inexpensive" resolution of their cases, defendants
might want the opposite. 121
Congested and slow courts may deter victims from filing their claims
in Venezuela and force those who have already sued to settle their cases
quickly in order to avoid costly trials. It is true that if a trial takes long,
defendants will have to face that cost too, but that might not hurt their
pocketbooks as much as it would the plaintiffs'.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, the reasons why litigants decide to use a particular forum
depends heavily on important strategic considerations that go beyond the
legal arguments presented in the courts. Disputants, as migratory birds, fly
north or south in search of a place that offers the best shelter for them. It
seems that Latin American plaintiffs have found it by flying north to the
United States - whereas, not surprisingly, the American defendant
corporations prefer to fly south to Latin America.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1152.
121. Id.; Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (among the important private
interests to be considered in forum non conveniens analysis are "practical problems that make trial
of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive").
